Abstract. A (k, )-robust combiner for collision-resistant hash-functions is a construction which from hash-functions constructs a hash-function which is collision-resistant if at least k of the components are collisionresistant. One trivially gets a (k, )-robust combiner by concatenating the output of any − k + 1 of the components, unfortunately this is not very practical as the length of the output of the combiner is quite large. We show that this is unavoidable as no black-box (k, )-robust combiner whose output is significantly shorter than what can be achieved by concatenation exists. This answers a question of Boneh and Boyen (Crypto'06).
Introduction
A function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v is a collision-resistant hash-function (CRHF), if no efficient algorithm can find two inputs M = M where H(M ) = H(M ), such a pair (M, M ) is called a collision for H.
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In the last few years we saw several attacks on popular CRHFs previously believed to be secure [17, 18] . Although provably secure 2 hash-functions exist (see e.g. [3] and references therein), they are rather inefficient and rarely used in practice. As we do not know which of the CRHFs used today will stay secure, it is natural to investigate combiners for CRHFs. In its simplest form the problem is the following: given two hash-functions
can we construct a new hash-function which is collision-resistant if either H 1 or H 2 is? The answer is that of course we can, just concatenate the outputs:
As any collision M, M for H is also a collision for H 1 and H 2 , if either H 1 or H 2 is collision-resistant, so is H. Unfortunately the length of the output of H is the sum of the output lengths of H 1 and H 2 , this makes the combiner quite unattractive for practical purposes.
The Boneh-Boyen and Our Result
Boneh and Boyen [2] ask whether one can combine CRHFs such that the output length is (significantly) less than what can be achieved by concatenation. They prove a first negative result in this direction, namely that there is no black-box construction for combining CRHFs in such a way that the output is shorter than what can be achieved by concatenation under the additional assumption that this combiner queries each of the components exactly once. They ask whether a similar impossibility result can be obtained in the general case where the combiner is allowed to query the components several times. We answer this question in the affirmative: any combiner for functions with range {0, 1} v must have output length at least (v − O(log(q))) bits 3 , where q is the number of oracle calls made by the combiner. Stated in asymptotic terms, if q ∈ 2 o(v) is subexponential, then the output length is in (1 − o(1))v , and if q is constant the output length is in v − O(1), this must be compared to v which is trivially achieved by concatenation. (k, )-Robust Combiner. We actually consider the more general question whether secure and non-trivial (k, )-robust combiners for collision-resistant hash-functions exist. A (k, )-robust combiner is collision-resistant, if at least k (and not just one) of the components used are secure. We trivially get a (k, )-robust combiner by concatenating any − k + 1 of the components, 4 which gives an output length of v( − k + 1). We show that this cannot be significantly improved as any (k, )-robust combiner must have output length at least (v − O(log(q)))( − k + 1) − .
The main technical contribution of this paper is Lemma 2, which generalizes (and as a special case contains the statement of) Theorem 3 from [2] . Roughly, this lemma states that there exist hash-functions and a collision for any combiner with sufficiently short output, such that this collision does not trivially lead to collisions for all 5 of the hash-functions. The proof of this lemma follows from a simple application of the probabilistic method, and in particular is much simpler than the proof of Theorem 3 in [2] . An Information Theoretic Argument. There is a quite intuitive information theoretic argument why (k, )-robust combiners for CHRFs {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v whose output is significantly shorter than v( − k + 1) bits can't exist. We give this argument below, it will turn out that this simple approach gives an impossibility result which is much weaker than what we prove in this paper. This argument is shown only for motivational reasons and is not relevant for the rest of the paper, the reader can skip the rest of this section if this does not seem to be of interest.
Basically, the argument uses the fact that one can encode a collision for any function with output length w using roughly w bits 6 and if the function is uniformly random, then w bits are also necessary. Now if a combiner with short output is instantiated with uniformly random functions, (the encoding of) a collision for the combiner will simply be to short to encode the information necessary to find collisions for the components. A bit more precisely, for (1, 2)-robust combiners this argument goes as follows. Assume we are given a combiner C for two functions {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v whose output length is 2v −t (i.e. t bits less than concatenation). Now we simply sample two uniformly random functions H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v and output a collision M, M for C H1,H2 , such a collision can be encoded using 2v − t bits. To encode a collision for a random function {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v , v bits are necessary and sufficient. Thus given the collision for the combiner, we still lack about t/2 bits of information (i.e. we have that much min-entropy) about a collision for one of the H i 's, and would have to make about 2 t/2 more queries to this H i in order to find a collision.This argument only rules out very strong combiners, where from any collision on the combiner we expect to get a collision for both components very efficiently. For example it does not rule out the possibility of (1, 2)-robust combiners with range 3v/2 (which we can consider significantly less than 2v), where each collision for the combiner gives collisions for both components if we are ready to invest an additional O(2 v/4 ) queries. Such a combiner would still be sufficient if we are willing to assume that at least one of the components we combine has security (slightly more than) 2 v/4 . This assumption is very mild, as usually v is something like 160 or 256, such that the birthday bound 2 v/2 is infeasible, but if a collision can be found after 2 v/4 queries, the CRHF would be considered completely broken. More generally, the above argument does not rule out (1, 2)-robust combiners with output length 2v − t for a t where 2 t/2 queries are considered feasible (for an attacker). In contrast, the theorem proven in this paper rules out (1, 2)-robust combiners with output length 2v − t, unless the combiner itself makes 2 t/2 invocations to the components. 6 The following is a possible encoding. To define the encoding choose values X1, X2, . . . in {0, 1} w+1 uniformly at random. Now given a function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} w (which can be chosen adversarialy, but independent of the Xi's) let i be minimal such that f (Xi) has at least 2 preimages in {0, 1} w+1 and output any X ∈ {0, 1} w+1 where X = Xi and f (X) = f (Xi). The expectation of i is at most 2 (as the probability that f (Z) has only one preimage in {0, 1}
w+1 for a random Z is at most 1/2). Thus given X, we must make an expected number of at most 3 queries to f to find a collision (i.e. first compute f (X) and then try f (X1), f (X2), . . . until f (X) = f (Xi)). If we only have w + 1 − c (not w + 1) bits for the encoding, we can simply omit the last c bits in the encoding just described, and when decoding trying all 2 c possibilities for this bits, thus we need an expected number of 2 + 2 c evaluations of f to find a collision given w + 1 − c bits of X, which is better than no information at all if c is less than w/2.
Related Work
Combiners. The idea of combining two or more cryptographic components in order to get a system which is secure whenever at least one of the underlying primitives is secure is quite old. 7 The early results are on symmetric encryption schemes [1, 6, 11] . Combiners for asymmetric primitives were constructed by Dodis and Katz [5] (for CCA secure encryption schemes) and Harnik et al. [7] (for key-agreement). The general notion of a combiner was put forward by Herzberg [8] who calls them "tolerant combiners". In recent works one often calls them "robust combiners", a term introduced in [7] . Combiners have been generalized in several ways:
(k, )-Robust Combiners: [7] put forward the notion of (k, )-robust combiners as discussed in the last section. Such combiners are only guaranteed to be secure if at least k (and not just one) of the components used is secure. Interestingly, for natural primitives as statistically hiding commitments [8] and oblivious transfer [7] only 2-3 but no 1-2 combiners are known. Cross-Primitive Combiners: In a cross-primitive combiner the combined primitive is different from the components used, one can think of this as simultaneously being a reduction and a combiner. This notion was introduced by Meier and Przydatek [12] who construct a 1-2 private information retrieval to oblivious transfer cross-primitive combiner, which is interesting as normal 1-2 combiners for oblivious transfer might not exist [7] . Efficiency and Other Parameters: In practice the mere existence of a combiner is not enough, as the parameters of a combiner are important. Efficiency is always of concern, although for some primitives like bit-commitments only very inefficient combiners are known [8] , for most primitives where combiners are known to exist, also efficient realizations are known [7, 8] . Besides efficiency, for different primitives also other parameters are important, in particular this paper is about the output-length of combiners for CRHFs.
Collision Resistance. collision-resistant hash-functions are very important and subtle [14] cryptographic primitives which have attracted a lot of research, even more in the recent years as widely used (presumably) collision-resistant hash-functions as MD5 or SHA-1 have been broken [17, 18] . Here we only mention some of the generic results on CRHFs.
Simon [16] shows that collision-resistant hash-functions cannot be constructed form one-way functions via a black-box reduction. On the positive side, Naor and Yung [13] show that for some applications (in particular for signature schemes) collision resistance is not necessary, as universal one-way hash-functions are enough. Those can be constructed from one-way functions [10, 15] .
Merkle and Damgård show that by iterating a CRHF with fixed input length, one gets a CRHF for inputs of arbitrary length. Most CRHFs used today follow this approach. Coron et al. [4] show that the Merkle-Damgård construction does not give a random function if instantiated with a random function (which was not the design goal of this construction), but that this can be achieved with some small modifications. Joux [9] shows that for iterated hash-functions (like the Merkle-Damgård construction) finding many values which hash to the same value is not much harder than finding an ordinary collision. As a consequence concatenating the output of such hash-functions does not increase the security: let H 1 , H 2 be iterated hash-functions with v bits output, then one can find a collision for H(X) = H 1 (X) H 2 (X) in time O(v2 v/2 ).
Combiners For CRHFs
Informally, a (k, )-robust combiner for CRHFs is a construction (modeled as an oracle circuit C) which, if instantiated with any hash-functions H 1 , . . . , H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v , is collision-resistant if at least k of the H i 's are. In order to show that a construction is a (k, )-robust combiner, one must provide an efficient procedure P which given two colliding inputs for the combiner, finds collisions for at least − k + 1 of the underlying H i 's. In this paper we only consider black-box combiners as defined in [7] , this means that C and P are only given oracle access to the H i 's.
The following definition of a (k, )-robust combiner is a generalization of the definition given in [2] , where only the case k = 1 was considered.
Definition 1 A combiner for collision-resistant hash-functions {0, 1}
* → {0, 1} v is a pair (C, P ) where C is an oracle circuit and P is an oracle probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPTM)
There are types of oracle gates (tapes) in C (P ). With B H1,...,H (X) (where B is C or P ) we denote the output of B on input X when the types of oracle gates are instantiated with functions H 1 , . . . , H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v respectively.
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We say that P k-succeeds on M, M ∈ {0, 1} * and oracles H 1 , . . . , H if its output contains collisions for all but at most k − 1 of the H i 's, i.e. for
we have
if for all (compatible) H 1 , . . . , H and all collisions (M, M ) on C H1,...,H we have
We say that (C, P ) is an (k, )-robust combiner if it is -secure for a small .
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For example consider the following (k, )-robust combiner (C, P )
As any collision M, M for C H1,...,H is a collision for H i for i = 1, . . . , − k + 1,
So (C, P ) can be considered a secure (k, )-robust combiner, as from any collision on C H1,...,H we get from P collisions for all but k − 1 of the H i 's, thus if k of the H i 's are secure, also C H1,...,H must be secure. The output length of C is n = v( − t + 1), by the following theorem this cannot be significantly improved.
n has q C oracle gates and P makes at most q P oracle calls. Suppose that
Then there exist M, M ∈ {0, 1} m and functionsĤ i : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v for i = 1, . . . , relative to which
For the special case where k = 1 and C queries eachĤ i exactly once (which are the constructions considered in [2] ) the bound on n can be improved to n < v − 1 and m > n or n < v and m − 1 > n.
The last statement slightly improves on the main result from [2] where a stronger n < m−log bound was needed in order to get n < v . As we can find a collision for any function with range {0, 1} v in 2 v/2 steps, in order to reason about CRHFs with range {0, 1} v the value 2 v/2 must be unfeasibly large. In particular for any reasonable combiner q P + q C 2 v/2 and thus the advantage (2) will be very small. Following [2] , to prove Theorem 1 it is sufficient to prove that hashfunctions H 1 , . . . , H and a collision M, M exists where during the computation of C H1,...,H on inputs M and M at least k of the H i 's are not queried on two distinct inputs X, X where H i (X) = H i (X ). Note that this means that one does not trivially get a collision for those H i 's when learning M, M . Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , }, |J| = k be the indices of these k H i 's. We prove the existence of such H i 's and M, M in Lemma 2 below. Then, from such H 1 , . . . , H and M, M we can get theĤ 1 , . . . ,Ĥ as required by Theorem 1, by settingĤ i (X) = H i (X) for all inputs X which appear as input to H i in the computation of C H1,...,H (M ) or C H1,...,H (M ), andĤ i (X) is assigned a random value otherwise. Clearly M, M is also a collision for CĤ 1,...,Ĥ , moreover allĤ i where i ∈ J are "very" collision-resistant, as we just randomly defined their outputs, except on a subset of inputs which itself does not contain a collision, Lemma 1 below is a formal statement of this intuitive argument.
Proof (of Theorem 1). The theorem follows from Lemmata 1 and 2.
In the lemmata below 11 let -W i (X) be the set of oracle queries to H i made while evaluating C H1,...,H (X).
} be the set of corresponding outputs (taken without repetition).
Lemma 1 Let (C, P ) be a (k, )-robust combiner, where C has q C oracle gates and P makes at most q P oracle calls. Assume there exist oracles
v , i = 1, . . . , and messages M, M such that
Then there exist deterministicĤ i : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v , i = 1, . . . , relative to which
Proof. Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , }, |J| = k be the indices of the k hash-functions for which no collision occurs during the computation of C H1,...,H on input M and M , i.e. ∀j ∈ J :
For i ∈ J we letĤ i := H i , and for each i ∈ J let R i : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v be uniformly random and
which come up on the computation of C H1,...,H on inputs M, M , let Q denote all those inputs together with the corresponding outputs.
Let P be the oracle PPTM which makes at most q P oracle calls and maximizes the probability α defined below.
α is an upper bound on Adv
, as one possibly strategy for P is to first compute M, M , which given Q can be done without access to theĤ i oracles, and then simulate PĤ 1,...,Ĥ (M, M ) and output the output of this simulation. 12 To save on notation let P * denote P Ĥ 1,...,Ĥ (Q). We say that P * found a collision if for some 13Ĥ i , i ∈ J it makes an oracle queryĤ i (X) where either for a previous query X = X toĤ i we haveĤ i (X) =Ĥ i (X ) or
. . , q P let C i denote the event that P * found a collision after the i'th oracle query is made. If the i'th oracle query is to aĤ j where j ∈ J or a query which has already been made we cannot get a collision, so
So assume that the i'th oracle query is a new query X to aĤ j where j ∈ J. Then H i (X) = R i (X) is uniformly random and independent of any previous outputs, thus the probability that it will collide with any of the ≤ i previous queries tô H i or with one the ≤ 2q C values in
Even if ¬C q P , i.e. P * does not find a collision for someĤ i , i ∈ J, there still is a tiny chance that P * guesses U i , U i whereĤ i (U i ) =Ĥ i (U i ) for some of the i ∈ J. The probability of this is at most |J|/2 v ≤ k/2 v . Taking everything together:
We're almost done, except that in the above inequality, theĤ i 's are not deterministic as required by the lemma, but randomized (as the R i 's were chosen at random). We can get fixedĤ i 's for which (4) holds by choosing the R i 's so they minimize the left hand side of (4).
Lemma 2 Let C : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n be as in the previous lemma. Then whenever n < (v − 2 log(2q C For the special case where k = 1 and C queries each H i exactly once (which are the constructions considered in [2] ) the bounds on n can be improved to n < v − 1 and m > n or n < v and m − 1 > n.
Proof. Consider the following random experiment. First functions H i : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} v are sampled uniformly at random. 14 Then M, M ∈ {0, 1} m are sampled uniformly at random. We define the events E 1 and E 2 as 
Let q i denote the number of H i oracle gates in C, note that i=1 q i = q C . We can upper bound Pr[E 2 ] by the probability that the best oracle algorithm A H1,...,H which can query the i'th oracle H i at most 2q i times finds a collision for at least − k + 1 of the H i 's. 15 As the H i 's are all independent random functions, the best A can do is to query it i'th oracle on 2q i distinct inputs (which ones is
